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Abstract
To minimize negative effects, it is necessary to well-
consider workers’ retirement intentions and decisions 
when government formulates and implements postponing 
statutory retirement age scheme having significant 
influences on interests of government and workers. In 
reality, formation of workers’ retirement strategies is not 
based on perfect information and complete rationality, but 
affected by social relation network. This paper establishes 
a simulation experiment model to simulate reflections 
of workers being confronted with a delaying retirement 
scheme. The results after running a simple experiment 
show that a worker’ retirement intention and decision 
may change after referring to link-persons’ mainstream 
opinions no matter how decision-making ability he/she 
has.
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INTRODUCTION
Statutory retirement age1 is an essential social economic 
parameter. Governments can make interventions in some 
other important social economic variables, say revenue 
and expenditure of the social pension insurance fund or 
employment capacity and structure of labor market, by 
adjusting it. In order to improve social administrative 
efficiency, it is considered necessary for government to 
select an appropriate time to extend statutory retirement 
age2. However, it’s no doubt for workers that postponing 
retirement will bring about utility decrease owning to 
reduction of spare time. So, the attitude of workers, who 
are for or against delaying retirement scheme, will have 
a decisive impact on effects of this scheme. An example 
that the government of France extended the statutory 
retirement age from 60 to 62, which then causing social 
instability, indicates that it is the game pattern between a 
government and social public that decides social policies’ 
effects3. Particularly, if a government unilaterally imposes 
to delay retirement, touching the core interests of workers, 
without accurate grasp of workers’ opinion, the social 
crisis will be inevitable.
1In some state without explicit regulations on statutory retirement age, to regulate statutory age entitlement for enjoy social pension is a com-
mon approach.
2Delaying retirement scheme is regarded as having many positive effects for government, for example, can reduce the payment gap of current 
social pension fund; can decrease support rate and increase the demographic dividend; can utilize high skilled human resources more effi-
ciently, and etc.
3The French government proposed the retirement system reform on July 13, 2010. the bill would raise the minimum retirement age from 60 
to 62. once put forward that the bill is strongly opposed by opposition parties and trade unions in France. Demonstrations and strikes fell and 
rose, which result in great losses for French economy. The leader of socialist party threatened to recovery the minimum retirement age to 60 
again once he won the presidential election.
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In China, a research institute with government 
background put forward the conception of delaying 
statutory retirement age in 2008 due to consideration of 
cope with social pension payment pressure in the near 
future. When assessing effects of this idea, Chinese 
researchers are always trying to explore how replacement 
ratio of pension, post, and some other elements affect 
workers’ retirement intentions and decisions through 
some statistical method. There is an apparent defect 
without considering impacts of social relation network 
on the retirement intention and decision of a worker. To 
solve this problem, this paper will build a model through 
simulation method based on the concept of social network 
so as to put forward a more scientific method to evaluate 
effects of postponing retirement scheme in China.
1.  INFLUENCE FACTORS ON EFFECTS 
O F  P O S T P O N I N G  R E T I R E M E N T 
SCHEME
Generally, the basis referred by government when 
formulating statutory retirement age policy subsume 
not only workers’ natural physiological index but also 
several social administration indexes, such as the average 
life expectancy, rate of unemployment, ratio of social 
support, social pension payment gap, and etc. Whether 
workers support postponing retirement scheme or 
not, will decide its effects directly. According to some 
respective studies based on statistics samples extracted 
from Chinese workers by Chinese researchers, age, 
education background, income level and nature of job 
are main factors to affect workers’ retirement intentions 
and decisions significantly (Sun & Wu, 2009). Obviously, 
impact of social network elements, such as the ideas of 
family members, friends, leaders at higher level, nature 
of working unit, and differences among workers, such as 
individual decision-making ability, intention stability, had 
not been taken into Liao’s consideration. Therefore, it is 
necessary to seek a better way to fit closer to the reality of 
the process following which workers form their retirement 
intentions and make retirement decisions. 
This paper researches effects of delaying retirement 
scheme from the perspective of social network1. The 
constructed model is made up of two types of nodes. One 
node represents workers, the nature of which include 
name, age, social identification marker2, nature of post, 
replacement rate of basic pension, their opinions to the 
delaying retirement scheme, their capacities of making 
decisions, the stability of their decisions, and link-
persons they contacting with (say relatives, classmates, 
workmates, friends and so on). The other node represents 
various communities which can be divided into working 
units and other communities which may have effects on 
workers’ retirement intentions and decisions, such as 
enterprises in the same industry, superior departments, 
customer units and so on. There are also some edges 
representing information dissemination medias in this 
social network model. Whether it is community or 
individual, whether he/she plays the role of opinion 
leader, adherent or some others, all of impacts cannot be 
made without proper information dissemination medias. 
Different information dissemination media also affects 
workers’ retirement intentions and decisions. 
Standing for the view of social network, this paper 
will well-consider complexity of formation of workers’ 
retirement intentions and decisions. Assumption as usual, 
if individual was a rational people completely; the main 
optimization goals of him/her when making decisions will 
be economic benefits in the case of information symmetry. 
But reality is information about delaying retirement is 
not entirely symmetrical, it is unsubstantial to establish 
mathematical optimization algorithm completely 
according to imperfect information. What’s more, when 
we analyzed the social problems, a worker cannot be 
completely regarded as a rational person, because there 
are so many irrational factors, say emotional factors, 
affecting works’ intentions and decisions. For example, 
someone would like to postpone retirement to avoid 
formation of the sense of emptiness owing to out of work; 
or someone would have too more important life planning, 
such as touring or taking care of great-grandchild, to 
take huge income difference before and after retirement 
into account and have to or be willing to retire directly 
no matter how retirement scheme changes; or in other 
cases, someone cannot analyze all of pros and cons and 
economic profit and loss of delaying retirement due to 
insufficient information, and then vary his/her ultimate 
retirement intention and decision because of the influence 
from link-persons’ opinion. It’s very clear that all of 
the above described cannot be accurately specified only 
by a simple model or a regression equation. This study 
tries to break through the difficulties through designs of 
simulation experiment.
2 .   D E S I G N S  O F  S I M U L A T I O N 
EXPERIMENT
In experience, views of most of workers on delaying 
1Scholars observing society from the perspective of social network propose that all of the decisions made at individual level should be consid-
ered at social network level. The theories of social network regards social structure as network structure, being made up of nodes and edges. 
Nodes represent individuals, groups or orgnizations; edges represent relations among these nodes. According to this theory, all of actions of 
one node will be influented by link-persons in the social relation network.
2Social identification markers refer to markers used to distinguish somebody in social relation network, for example, ID number or mobile 
phone number and etc.
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retirement scheme may not be absolute extreme but a 
continuous change in attitude swing. Additionally, non-
economic rationality and non-independent decision 
process are both important characteristics that should be 
described in a model of complex social network. In this 
paper, a dynamic model with communities is presented 
which takes into account the differences in community 
structures on the basis of Deffuant model, and a simple 
simulation experiment is to be run (Cheng, Xu, Peng, & 
Zhou, 2013).
2.1  Selection of Parameter (Cheng, et al., 2013; Liu, 
Hu, Luo, & Si, 2009) 
There are three types of agents, that is, receptor agent 
of delaying retirement scheme, community agent that 
receptor involves in, and media agent.
Table 1
Parameter of Receptor Agent
Parameter Parameter description and value
Name Name (a) = a
Age Age (a) = actual age (take the actual age of integer)
Gender Gender = 0, female; gender = 1, male
Address Address (a) = telephone number or mobile phone number 
Post
Types of post: 
post = 1, senior executive; post = 2, middle managers; post = 3, production and sales staff; post=4, logistics service 
staff; post = 5, research staff; post = 6, administrative staff
Replacement rate Pro forma replacement rate of pension:Replacement rate of pension values among [40%, 200%]
Opinion Worker’s decision intention: Continuously value among [0, 1], opposition for 0, support for 1.
Capability Decision capability: Continuously value among [0, 1], the bigger, the stronger ability of decision; contrarily, the less, the weaker ability
Uncertainty
Uncertainty degree of worker’s decision intention:
To value among (0,0.2] or [0.8,1) in the initial intention represents someone is not easily affected by social network, 
called as determined ones; 
To value among (0.2, 0.8) represents contrarily someone is susceptible to influent from social network, called as 
opinion wiggler; 
To value 0 or 1 means someone has extreme opinion on delaying retirement scheme and will not be affected by 
social network, called as opinion leader.
Contact-list
Contact list: 
Contact-list (a) = (L1, L2, …, L n), Li represents link-persons of the researched person, (i = { 1, 2, …, n }). 
Properties of Li include: Name (i)=I; Address (i) = telephone number or mobile phone number of i; Influence-
Degree (i) ∈ [-1, 1]; contact distant (a, i) = min (x), x is the number of all contact from a to i on contact-list.
Table 2
Parameter of Community Agent
Parameter Parameter description and value
Type Types of working units:
type = 1 is public sector; type = 2 is institution (type = 2.0 represents the institution supported by financial fund; 
type = 2.1 represents the institution may be or is going to be reconstructed as enterprise); type = 3 is public 
ownership enterprise (type = 3.1 represents enterprises administrated by State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission; type = 3.2 represents financial enterprise administrated by China Banking Regulatory 
Commission, China Insurance Regulatory Commission, or China Securities Regulatory Commission; type = 
3.3 represents the enterprises administrated by other departments under the State Council or managed by mass 
organizations); type = 4 is private economics (type = 4.1 represents leading enterprises; type = 4.2 is competitive 
enterprises); type = 5 is self-employed economics; type = 6 is NGO; type = 7 is virtual economics; type = 8 is other 
irregular organizations.
Address Address (a) = office phone
Field Business field:
According to industry classification under statistics of national economy in China, to value natural number, such as 1, 
2, 3, and etc.
Scale Scale of community:
To value positive integer in accordance with the number of the community
Ei External impact of community (short for Ei ):
The capability of decision-makers of one community compelling another person of other community to change his/
her opinion. Ei is proportional to compromise coefficient u,u∈[0,0.5] 
Ic Internal cohesion of community (short for Ic ):
Speed of forming inner consensus. Ic is proportional to inner compromise coefficient v (v∈[0,0.5]), inner 
connection probability, and inner active degree a (a∈[0,1]) .
34Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
Retirement Strategy Study Based on Simulation Experiment
Table 3
Parameter of Media Agent
Parameter Parameter description and value
Type
Types of medias:
type = 0 represents direct expression; type = 1 represents MicroBlog; type = 2 represents Micro message; type = 
3 represents Fetion; type = 4 represents BBS; type = 5 represents telephone or mobile phone; type = 7 represents 
other communication medias.
Trust Authority of media:To value positive real number among [0, 10], The higher authority, the larger the value.
Influence Influence sphere of media:To value positive real number among [0, 1]. The larger effect, the larger the value.
Table 4
Parameters in the Strategy Space of Postponing Statutory Retirement Age
Strategy Description of strategy Value of parameter
One step scheme To postpone statutory retirement age “n” years at one time. N = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Step by step scheme
To select the appropriate reform period “t”, to defer 
statutory retirement age “i” years every “y” years 
until to achieve planned target “l”.
t = 2015, 2016, …, 2050
y = 2, 3, …, 5
i = 1, 2, 3
l = 61, 62, ..., 65
Standard service-length 
scheme
Only up to standard service-length (e.g. “h” years), 
retirement process can be entered.
h = 40, 41, 42
2.2  Rule of Action
2.2.1  Rules of Opinion Leaders
a. The probability of Ileader tending to a delay scheme is 
P1, P1 = P2×g (degree), (degree is the influence of a delay 
scheme on utility of Ileader, to value among [-10,10]; g 
(degree) is an increasing function; P2 is the probability 
that Ileader express his/her opinion in some community, P2 = 
f (Ei, Ic ), f (Ei, Ic ) is an increasing function).
b. If opinion ∈ [0, 0.2], then add 1 to oppose- num.
c. If opinion ∈ [0.8, 1], then add 1 to support- num.
2.2.2  Rules of Opinion Followers and Opinion 
Wigglers
a. The probability of Iothers tending to a delay scheme is 
P1, P1 = P2×g (degree) (degree is the influence of a delay 
scheme on utility of Iothers, to value among [-10,10]; g 
(degree) is an increasing function; P2 is the probability 
that Iothers express his/her opinion in some community, P2 
= f (Ei, Ic )×h (comment-num), (f (Ei, Ic) is an increasing 
function; h (comment-num) is the propotion of persons 
who have open comments on the delaying retirement 
scheme. h (comment-num) is also an increasing function).
b. Iothers search for the person “K” whose opinion has 
minimum difference with Iothers according to the probability 
of 1-P1. If the difference of opinions between Iothers and 
K is less than “d” (“d” is a threshold), then Iothers will 
adjust his/her opinion as opinion’(i):
opinion’(i) = opinion (i) + f (k,i) (opinin (k)-opinion (i))
(f (k, i ) is the function represents influence of K on 
Iothers).
c. If opinion’(i) < 0.5, then add 1 to oppose-num; 
otherwise, add 1 to support-num.
3.  A SIMPLE SIMULATION EXPERIMENT
Based on the above experimental model, a simple 
simulation experiment was run.
In the simulation experiment, set link-persons of every 
receptor agent obey a random distribution. The experiment 
ultimately indicates evolution process of receptor agents’ 
retirement decision in a uniform random social network. 
In this experiment, given “t” years for receptor agent to 
make his/her final retirement decision after exchange of 
ideas with link-persons every year, the difference between 
final decision and initial idea on questionnaire will be 
analyzed in-depth. Only to consider effects derived from 
changes of replacement rate of pension, then we got a 
series of interest results.
The initial conditions automatically generated by 
computer is as follows: 800 nodes (N = 800) and 617 
of them agree with delaying retirement scheme at the 
beginning, 500 edges (kmax=500), t=10.
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Figure 1
Decision Capability of Every Receptor
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It can be clearly seen from Figure 1 that decision 
capability of every receptor agent obey uniform 
distribution in [0,1]. Additionally, 247 isolated nodes 
without link-persons generated in the stochastic network 
are found to stick to their original choices; and other 
nodes are non-isolated nodes with one link-person at least, 
or 5 link-persons at most. the network density is 0.15%. 
Table 5
Changes of Non-Isolated Nodes’ Decisions After t 
Years of Evolution 
0 1
Initial 123 430
End 171 382
Table 5 tells us that 48 non-isolated nodes change their 
minds from support of delaying retirement to opposition, 
which means the final decision of non-isolated nodes 
may be probably different from the initial choices. The 
percentage of changes is demonstrated in Table 6. 
Table 6
Changes of Receptor Agent’s Decision
Initial intention Final decision Proportion
1 0 0.219331
0 0 0.089219
1 1 0.579926
0 1 0.130112
It can be seen from Figure 2 that the proportion of 
mind-changes made by receptor agents with various levels 
of decision capability almost obey uniform distribution, 
which means the mind-changes are not be done only by 
those receptor agents with poor decisions capacity. 
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Figure 2 
Distribution of Decision Capability of Mind-Change 
Receptor Agents
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